Bangladesh, Myanmar, Vietnam and Thailand have large river deltas. The first three deltas have international commitments for so-called delta plans: large-scale national efforts to reshape deltas in light of future economic growth and climate change. Thailand's Chao Phraya delta has no such commitments. Why is this the case? This article proposes that Thailand's absence of a colonial past has retained a differently ordered institutional capacity and that Delta plans embed assumptions that fit poorly with a Thai worldview. The article relies on literature and adds original research collected on three separate field visits to Thailand.
organized water missions and engineering companies and knowledge institutes lobbied Thai governmental actors. 6 At the turn of the 20 th century, the Dutch irrigation engineer Homan van der Heide devised a plan for the Chao Phraya delta and became the first director of the Royal Irrigation Department (ten Brummelhuis, 2005) , and in the 1950s, the Dutch participated in World Bank-funded consortia for dam constructions (Sangkhamanee, 2018) . And so, like in neighboring countries, ties and precedent existed. Our question for this article is: what explains this lack of a Dutch delta plan in Thailand, and what does this say about knowledge-and policy-transfer?
Explanations readily suggest themselves. First, the absence of a delta plan in Thailand might be coincidental: Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Vietnam do have a delta plan; Thailand does not. And that is all there is to it. Other types of plans, techniques, tools and skills do 'travel' to Thailand: the 20 th century brought infrastructure, banking, telecommunications; the 21 st makes Bangkok a global hub in knowledge exchange (Baldwin, 2017) . Our fieldwork reveals that in water and climate governance as well, Thailand is well connected. A random outcome is then our null hypothesis and the rest of this article consists of arguments weighing against it. Importantly, in using historical accounts explaining present outcomes, causality will not be settled, and we have no such pretension. After all, history does not repeat, and there are never enough comparable cases to show non-spurious regularities. Nevertheless, reasoning can improve by exploring different possible explanations. The article relies on literature and adds original research collected on three separate field visits to Thailand.
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A second reason (and a building block in this article) is that Thailand retained independence in history. But independence by itself explains little and should not be an impediment, and moreover, it fails to explain why Thailand does take in other travelling knowledge. A third reason-one we also subscribe to but argue is incomplete-is that Thailand lacks the political or economic incentives of its neighbors. Indeed, for a Thai-Dutch engineer aiding the Dutch embassy to promote the Dutch water agenda, the case is clear (and we 'shouldn't overthink it'): 'it's really, really simple: we don't give money, as we do in Myanmar. Why would the Thai government accept?' 8 To be sure, Bangladesh has long been a 'donor darling'. In Myanmar, cyclone Nargis in the delta opened the country to foreign aid in 2008. And when Thailand was a developing country, it could receive World Bank loans conditional on 'structural adjustment'. And today, Thailand, still classified as a developing country, is an upper-middle-income economy, providing its own technical assistance to neighboring countries. Nevertheless, the economic explanation can only partially explain.
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Incentives explain how reluctance-a threshold-is overcome. It does not explain what constitutes the threshold. What could inhibit Delta plans to travel? 10 First, in Thailand, a continuous institutional development produced distinct policy-making practices. And second, we posit that delta plans are incongruent with these practices at the level of worldviews. Next, we thus describe a longue durée history of some Thai institutional elements. Then, we explore a worldview behind delta plans and explore points of incongruence with the proposed Thai worldview.
Historically settled institutional elements within the Chao Phraya delta
All Southeast Asian 'first-millennium polities share close historical links with the region's contemporary nation-states', most of all in Thailand (Stark, 2006) . Where does the germ of Thai institutions start and what are its distinctive elements? Takaya (1973) views Thai institutions as a series of best responses to river-related problems in the Chao Phraya river system, its history dividing into three periods: the city polis starting in the mountainous North in early Medieval times, then migrating South to the overwhelming floods of the river basin during the Kingdom of Ayutthaya, and then finally settling down in the previously inhospitable delta, transformed, under the guidance of the Bangkok Kings, into a rice bowl serving the city (Takaya, 1973) .
11 Aside from responses to ecological challenges, we argue technocratic cultures would also have had to develop alongside Buddhism, the city-state, and kingship. Buddhism, and with it writing systems and concepts of political organization, entered Southeast Asia via interregional trade networks. Buddhism arrived first in Myanmar and moved to Thailand with the Mon people, who settled the Dvaravati system of chiefdoms, a direct precursor to contemporary Thai kingship. Buddhism was not the only religious influence on institutions: the first century A.D. saw Hindu migrants enter, replacing a kin-ordered system with a hierarchical political-economic system (Murphy and Stark, 2016 Thailand continues fitting Buddhism to otherwise secular, but self-reformed political institutions.
City-states
Life in Southeast Asia was organized around city-states, ruled by Kings (Dellios, 2003; Embree, 1950) . Cities-and Kings-ruled across territories with decaying, sometimes overlapping radiuses of influence, measured by tributes paid 16 (Winichakul, 1994, Aryan, 6 The most prominent water governance institution, the Royal Irrigation Department, indeed was a continuation of the Ayutthaya ministries for irrigation and flood management, dating back to the 14 th century (Takaya, 1987 (Khanittanan, 2001) . Then the Burmese sacked Ayutthaya in 1767. The city ruined, the Royal seat moved South to a trading post in the delta, now incorporated into Bangkok. The new Buddhist Kingdom of Siam remained city based, transferring its elite administered mode of managing foreign trade (and ideas), and transforming the Chao Phraya delta to suit the King-ruled, trade-oriented city of Bangkok (Takaya, 1973) . Today, infrastructural mega-plans on governing water in the delta organize around the city, from the King's dyke to a master plan cut short by the 2014 political coup, to a large system of drainage tunnels.
Kingship
History brought Buddhist and Hindu influence to present-day Thai kingship. Buddhist kingship emphasizes keeping the peace between people; Hindu kingship emphasizes maintaining the order of things (Xing, 2011; Aryan, 2004 ). Yet kingship is attached to the waters as well. Ayutthaya Kings depended on the river and so did Bangkok's Kings. Canal-building projects in transforming the delta were a royal enterprise, for which Kings sometimes enlisted Western engineers and investors (Takaya 1987 (Handley, 2006) , on which more later.
Independence from imperialism
Siam was never part of a European empire. It evaded the fate of its neighbors, who experienced imposed institutional reforms and postcolonial reactions. As a result, currents of Buddhism, the city-state, and kingship persist within the institutional fabric, despite Thailand also being a secular nation-state, ruled by alternating democratic and autocratic regimes.
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The rest of South and Southeast Asia experienced Western Powers translating foreign religious, scientific and classical liberal ideas into institutions (Bayly 2002 were reformed to fit with the colonizing country's interests and normative agendas, while sui generis elements such as kingship, religious practices and patronage networks were either abolished or disturbed and altered (Bayly 2002) . In Bangladesh, Islam was kept outside governing, and after independence, Muslims activists cooperated with activists with post-colonial ideologies (Novak, 1993) . In Vietnam, where pre-colonial times exhibited well-developed, but now 'lost modernities' (Woodside, 2006) , the religious strands of Taoism, Confucianism and Buddhism adjusted to a Communist bureaucracy that did not respect a separation between State and religion (Scigliano, 1964) . In Myanmar, Buddhism is an even stronger force in the conceptualization of daily life than in Thailand and it still pervades political thought (Walton, 2017) . Burmese institutions were first reshaped in the image and to the purposes of the British. In post-colonial times, institutions were reshaped to the purposes of first a 'non-aligned' parliamentary democracy, then by the purposes of a (paranoid) military regime (Myint-U 2006) , and today, in response to the normative agendas of foreign and international institutions, including in water governance (Hogendoorn et al., 2018) . Buddhist views were kept outside government, hardened in response to unsuccessful Christian religious missions (Bayly 2002) , and took on a political role versus the military (Walton, 2017) . Siam, however, managed to stay independent, a buffer between Imperial giants, reforming its institutions with more autonomy (Winichakul, 1994) . Throughout the colonial era, the Siamese elite (footnote continued) was framed as a zero sum game, stimulating the formation of relevant norms in such games. This institutionalized frame made for strong Kings and intense power struggles, a settled dynamic which we see to this day and will play a role in our argument. Within the Southeast Asian city-state system, power did decay in a radius, when moving away from the polis or by being inaccessible. Decay of power meant that cities had overlapping spheres of influence. Areas could pay tribute to different cities at once. 17 Aryan: 'It can be asserted that, in the pre-modern time or before the 20 th century, the Kingdom was not a single political organization under a unified authority. In fact, it comprised of the most powerful township, the capital, and a number of other major and minor townships with varying degrees of autonomy. In times of peace each township ran its own affairs and paid tribute: minor townships paid tribute to major ones and all did so to the most powerful. Because of geographical barriers and communication difficulty, the capital could exercise the direct rule only over an area within a radius of, say, two days of traveling.' (Aryan, 2004, p.2) 18 Brought there by the legendary U Thong. U Thong was long thought to be a family member of Chinese merchants. 19 Even today, royal traditions persist of choreographed displays of ceremonial riverboats, paying homage to the linkage between royalty and the Chao Phraya river. 20 Lèse-majesté laws prevent public criticism by imposing long jail sentences. 21 Rama IX was a skilled navigator amidst this turmoil; the election commissioner Gothan Aryan said: 'King Bhumibol assured the continuity of monarchy by maintaining it above the competition between elite within the military and bureaucracy and between them and non-bureaucrat elite. The King cooperated with the winning sides and finally when democratic force seems to (footnote continued) prevail, the monarchy is credited for assuring the stability for this emergence, proving that constitutional monarchy promotes constitutional democracy.' (Aryan, 2004, p. John Bowring with ceremonial pomp on the river. In the Bowring treaty of 1855, King Mongkut agreed to end the Royal Storage (its administered trade): non-royals could now trade with foreigners (Winichakul, 1994) . The wane of China, the threat of power imbalance, improvements in maritime technology, and a Thai competitive advantage over the colonies made trade with Europeans attractive (Evers, 1987) . The loss of royal privilege was not the only institution to go. For example, the Western version of a map gained influence, and changing a decaying radius of influence of city-states to a fixed territory with hard borders; through Western maps, Siam formed into a nation-state (Winichakul, 1994) . De facto, the city of Bangkok could remain the schwerpunkt, supplied by a rural periphery.
Siam did modernize, absorbing pressure channeled by domestic diplomats instead of abscising the past through imposed reforms chosen by foreign bureaucrats. Thai elites chose to reform the education system (delivering civil servants promoting Thai views) and changed an absolute monarchy into a constitutional one in 1932. The Chao Phraya delta too did transform. Canals first increased from improved technologies and financial speculations and roads did not exist (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983) . After World War II, the U.S. became a military and economic presence in Bangkok. Highways and skyscrapers paved over the aquatic canal-based society, and with it, influenced how Thai people conceived of living together (Jensen and Morita, 2017) .
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In summary, the Thai have absorbed, even welcomed outside influence; yet unlike its neighbors, Thailand maintained autonomy (Winichakul, 1994; Bayly, 2004 Thai institutional continuities, including in technocratic institutions for water governance. In the absence of incentives, any foreign idea would need, we argue, congruence with a complex worldview performed in these institutions.
A genealogy of Dutch delta plans
We propose Delta plans import assumptions fitting poorly with the elements of Thai institutions and worldviews outlined above. Delta plans are very long-term Master plans for geophysical river deltas that the Dutch government, Dutch research institutes and Dutch private sector operators, such as globally operating engineering companies have tried to sell across the world. Delta plans formed from concepts rooted in meeting Dutch flood management challenges in the delta of the Rhine and the Meuse. When a delta plan travels to a target delta, it leaves behind the Dutch environment, institutions, practices, and historical intentions. Policymakers, knowledge institutes, diplomats and engineering companies de-emphasize those differences and emphasize features with overlap between deltaic regions (Zegwaard, 2016) . Focusing on the overlap makes it easy to visualize how a well-performing arrangement in the Netherlands should also work abroad. The similarities afford the Dutch to capitalize on their hard-won experience, making a national identity into a signal of engineering-quality in the competitive global water sector. Yet apart from the physical similarities, the delta plans frame deltas as backward areas to 'develop' into nation-states, taking into account long-term futures.
Nation-states
Delta plans have a Dutch pedigree. Delta plans imply a political economy continuous with 19 th -century progressive liberalism (Bergsma, 2017) . Hence, the concepts embedded in delta plans settled not just in meeting past Dutch challenges of keeping water out, but from a political project of developing backward regions in. 
Futures
After the Dutch delta plans were implemented, delta plans became an abstracted, exportable type-a profitable, applicable concept to foreign deltas, focusing on economic growth, nation-building and vulnerability to climatic threats over long time frames.
32 Delta plans 26 Bowring was also a political economist and a lifelong friend and former employee of the founder of utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham. 27 For most of Thai history, the delta region itself was uninhabited for reasons of climate. The dry spells in the monsoon climate made water storage during heavy rainfall and flooding imperative for agriculture. The delta was a way of extending water flows from the sea to far-flung civilizations. This view differs from how, for example, the Dutch attend to their delta. Jensen and Morita argue that for the Dutch, the delta is land first, subject to land reclamation (Jensen and Morita 2017) . That is certainly true today, though the name of the delta province of Zeeland (Sealand) gives a different signal. 28 Cambodia has not delta plan either, but here the reasons cannot be explained through the same logic. 29 Thailand, by contrast, dug canals in the Chao Phraya delta to let the sea in.
The delta was an extension of the sea, facilitating trade (Jensen and Morita 2017) . 30 Formed into a loose Republic with placeholder rulers (or Stadthouders). 31 Notable here is that the Zuiderzee committee was headed by the physicist Hendrik Lorentz. Faced with difficulties in figuring out the enormous tidal flows, Lorentz managed to innovate the language and with it the mode of inference from narrow empiricism to mathematically formal by inventing the hydrodynamic equations of motion. These equations formed the basis of hydrological modeling. Not much later, the techno-scientific development continued in the setting up of the Delft Hydraulic lab, started by the human computer of the Zuiderzee project, J. Th. Thijsse. And from this lab, mathematical modeling later took shape, especially with its successor Deltares, one of the driving organizations exporting Dutch delta plans. 32 In the Netherlands, 'delta plans' now seem to synonymous with any largescale government led problem-solving effort, hoping to bask in the glory of the original Delta plan of the mid-1950s. The 1990s already had its delta plan to conserve 'culture' at a national level. In 2015, a delta plan for mathematics education was set up. The delta plan as analogy is easily stretched. Houston, after Hurricane Harvey, for instance, needed a 'delta plan', wrote Dutch hydraulic engineers (Zwam, 2017) . Houston has no river delta. The term delta itself provides an illustrative case for how language migrates through posing analogies. For Herodotus, the Nile had a delta because its river mouth resembled the triangle of the Greek letter delta. Over the centuries, this shape foreground uncertain, far-away futures, making use of projections of demographics, economics, and more recently, climate science. For example, scenario planning (a method in delta plans) focuses on the 'robustness' of decisions within a quadrant of good and bad economic and climate futures. 33 In scenario-planning, these conjectured scenarios function as a best guess about the future, upon which strategic actions can be selected. The variables in those scenarios can collect or create data for any space or time-frame. This gives delta plans an aura of universal appliance. Future-oriented delta plans thus fit well with the agendas circulating in global knowledge networks (Zegwaard, 2016) , evoking nation-building in poor and undeveloped areas and projecting climate and economic scenarios over long time frames. Delta plans in Thailand's neighboring countries, for example, stimulate the following inferences: deltas in Vietnam, Myanmar and Bangladesh are of national importance and of future economic concern, and vulnerable to future climate change. Taking delta plans as variable signals for inference, they invariably emphasize desirable futures at the macro-level for a defined, deltaic territory.
Points of misfit between protestant-progressivism and ThaiBuddhism
Our claim is that a worldview travelling along with delta plans sits uneasily with the elements listed above. The main water governance institutions and policymaking practices in both the Netherlands and Thailand developed alongside distinct worldviews.
Robert Merton, the sociologist and historian of science, claimed modern science rooted in Protestant values (Merton, 1938) . 34 Protestants hoped to show a fit between Faith and Reason, Merton argued, resulting in improved methods of reasoning. Protestants also believed fate was predestined. A select few would make Heaven in a distant future of resurrection. The Protestant could study to find clues in the world on their own fate, and clues were made probable for those who performed public deeds in line with reason. Sacrificing time and effort for public benefit with the use of reason, a devout Protestant avoided the 'master sin': hedonic 'flesh pleasing' and 'idolatry' (Merton, 1938, p. 425) . Puritan ethos also favored mercantile profits and reasoning with applied capitalist uses, favoring the study of mathematics for accounting and physics for engineering. 35 Merton concludes: 'We would certainly be led to profound error were we to assume that religious beliefs played the perfunctory role which is generally their lot today' (Merton, 1938, p. 425) . Historians have criticized the Puritan thesis for its details (Morgan, 1979) . 36 Nevertheless, Protestantism favored the idea of imagining and deterministic futures and applying expertise to reach earthly, non-hedonic desirable futures. The Netherlands', for much of its institutional history as a republic and then nation-state, was a Protestant country, though a sizeable part of it was Catholic. The Dutch governmental institutions in which the original delta plans were developed arose in formerly Protestant regions. If we conjecture that history institutionalized a worldview in Thailand, the same must be said for The Netherlands. The delta of the Rhine and Meuse and around the 'Zuiderzee' were also firmly Protestant. Not surprisingly, delta plans fit well with the Protestant list mentioned above. Delta planning, we propose, favors the following order: seek clues for future possible states of the world (a gaze outward), then help select for actions expected to bring about a subset of publically desired states. First, delta plans emphasize how methods of reason can generate knowledge on distant futures (the fate of deltas) in demographic, climatic change and macroeconomic terms, where people in the delta-region cannot control these forces. Still, knowing how these forces will impact the delta is useful, resulting in probabilistic and nonprobabilistic information on distant futures. 37 And the way to find clues about the future is by starting public works with mercantile (Dutch) private sector operators, using applied mathematics and physics. Circulating delta plans are recipes for national and macro-level development. Fast economic growth within a fixed territory is something to strive after. Debts incurred are repaid in a richer future, and whether this is possible is made plausible to its planners by generating more information. The Thai worldview is organized differently, and apart from the powerful city-focus making the developing delta-frame a poor fit, the contrast between Protestantism and Buddhism is illustrative. Buddhist practice favors the following order in reasoning: subjective introspection and attending to disquiet, noticing whether one has good intentions, and only then fitting the right actions and thoughts with available means. Attention explores tensions, resolved through relating and rearrangement. The notion of desired futures-core to Progressivist/ Protestant thought should misfit in particular. Like Christianity, Buddhism comprises a varied set of traditions. The Thai and Burmese variant of Theravada Buddhism, for instance, mixes with local animistic practices (Manich Jumsai, 2000) . Buddhism does have invariants. Buddhism is, for one, a process philosophy. Things keep unfolding, evolving, geometrically, but the notion of a single future end state is foreign. Protestant predestination resembles the determinism of the Hindu Wheel of Dharma. Buddhism, an offshoot of Hinduism, is a departure in this respect. In Buddhism, an escape from the Wheel is not just a possibility, but an admirable aspiration, coming, in contrast to Protestantism's outward gaze, from a turn inward. Modern science addresses the objective, quantifiable, physical universe in order to gain power over the natural world. Buddhism guides attention to subjective, qualitative states of consciousness as a means to liberate the mind from its afflictive tendencies and obscurations (Wallace, 2006) . In Buddhism, the future and desires play a different role than in Protestantism. Buddhism has a non-metaphysical attitude towards the future. Regarding desire, not just hedonism, but all desire is to be detached from. The Buddhist monk works to quench desire and reach a future self of Nirwana, and the common person satisfices to reach an unknowable Karmic potential (Keyes et al., 1977) . Buddhists focus on four logical points (further specified in an 8-fold path): all is suffering, suffering comes from desiring, desiring is a mental process, and desiring is unceasing, never satisfied (Rahula, 2004) . As a result, one plays the cards one has been dealt; imagined futures foster desire. Thus, Buddhist ethics implies cultivation by removing disquiet from one's present 'interbeing' (i.e. one only exists as a set of relations within a set of relations, with no essence) (Priest, 2016) . 38 Epistemic pictures of futures and desired macro-states characterize (footnote continued) generalized to river mouths in general, whether they fitted into a triangle or not.
33 Interview Arcadis, October 2017 34 Earlier, in the Renaissance, more skeptical approaches to the study of God had arisen (in the margin), with for example the Jesuit Francisco Sanches concluding that God could be understood in a negative way-by subtracting what he was not-and rejecting the syllogistic arguments of the Church. And later Enlightenment thinkers credited with readying the mind for modern science, such as Descartes, Spinoza, Gassendi and Bayle were no atheists (Bayle was a Protestant). 35 To Merton's list, we might add the Christian cultivation of individualism (Dumont, 1985) . 36 They have not challenged the existence of a relationship between organized (Christian) religion and the growth of science. Also Polkinghorne (2006) , sees causes of the growth of science in the Christian doctrine of creation and the increasing reference in the 17 th century to a 'Book of Nature' besides the Book of Scripture.
37 Thinking about future uncertainty with rigor started in probability theory, with a notable trajectory from Keynes in the 1920's to Kolmogorov and Savage in the 1950s. 38 Interview Theravada Buddhist Monks and scholars at the Dhamma Home
Buddhist study center in Bangkok, March 2017 the nation-building of early Dutch delta plans and the climate catastrophe thinking in recent delta plans. Buddhism de-emphasizes imagining epistemic pictures of futures, focuses on one's inter-being and capacity, and on detachment from all desire. If present-day expertise intensive Delta plans fit with Protestant worldviews, do (some) present-day water governance arrangements in Thailand fit Buddhist views? To which we turn next.
The sufficiency economy and the Hydro Agro Informatics Institute

Sufficiency economy
In the 20 th century, the World Bank 'restructured' Thailand through the National Social and Economic Development Plan. Thai agriculture, governed since Medieval times, was forced in line with economic liberalism, producing tensions and farmer-debts. 39 These 'structural adjustments' and global market capitalismgenerally were increasingly perceived as a corrosive influence on Thainess. In response, King Rama IX formulated an alternative ideology for development. This Sufficiency Economy (SE) mixes Buddhism, development economics, and water management policy (Dreschler, 2016a) . The first SE Royal project occurred in 1951. By Rama IX's death in 2016, SE totalled 4596 projects. Instead of indebting others, the King used his charities and the Crown Property Bureau to subsidize or finance developments (Handley, 2006) . 40 An easy conceptual fit for Buddhist countries, the concept of SE has travelled to other countries (Buthan, for example). 41 The SE precepts focus attention on the present. They address how to live within one's current means, whether one is a farmer or a national policymaker. For example, SE influences the national agriculture agenda. 42 The SE precepts are normative, fitting the actions of civilians, politicians, civil servants and corporations to Buddhist principles, arguing not just against limitless growth and greed and for self-reliance, but de-emphasizing the importance of futures altogether. The core guiding principles in SE are moderation, understanding the consequences of actions on one's (social) environment ('reasonableness'), and dealing with personal risks ('self-immunity'). One learns to act on these principles by cultivating wisdom and virtue (Dreschler, 2016b) . Striving outside one's current means or inter-being is bound to cause suffering. SE manifests in different policies and initiatives, from local village level cooperatives based on self-generated discipline to national policies (Handley, 2006) . The SE is focused on a sustainable bootstrapping of capacity, deducing back from intent (Dreschler, 2016b ). An example of a low-tech small scale delta flood management project is given by the so-called 'Monkey Cheeks'. These retain water in times of flooding for use during drought. As such, Monkey Cheeks anticipate possibilities. 'Monkey cheeks' require no imagined far-flung futures. Possible extremes of proximate local water levels will do. Just as other policies taking place in rural cooperatives organized under the SE, they can be classified as local, low-tech conceptual fits. We will now discuss how expertise-intensive institutions similarly can fit with the Buddhist traits, even if they do not link explicitly, as the rurally-oriented SE policies do.
HAII
Expertise-intensive governing builds capacity within pre-existing and co-evolving institutions. Technocrats, to be sure, spend attention to ensure effective, 'rational' policies; yet such policies are also crafted to fit prevailing values and ideology: policy-making occurs within historically grown, religiously and politically infused constraints. The best example of a rigorous organization fitting with the SE ideology is the Hydro Agro Informatics Institute (HAII). After all, HAII was-ostensibly, at least-also Rama IX's idea.
HAII consists of policy analysts working with complex data analysis methods. Its main aim is to improve the fractured water governance of Thailand, consisting of 26 organizations with unclear responsibilities and little communication (Marks, 2016) . HAII also works closely with rural villages (stimulated by the King's subsidies to organize in line with the precepts of the Sufficiency Economy), connecting databases and mathematical formalisms to local knowledge. HAII is a network organization, improving, rearranging, and re-relating resources existing in the present state. HAII originates in the mid-1990s, after one of Bangkok's many floods. Rama IX shifted emphasis from a World Bank-loan grey infrastructure response, current when political and economic incentives arguably crossed any threshold-to strengthening information management within Thai flood management as a governance system. HAII was set up as a network hub and uses rigorous methods (for example using combinatorics) in data-management. 43 The (former) director of HAII, trained as a mathematician in combinatorics at the famous mathematical institute of ETH Zurich, disregarded climate scenarios (from GCMs-global climate models-and RCMs-regional climate models). For him, downscaled models of ensemble-based GCMs generating virtual futures could not form a rigorous basis for decision making.
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HAII focuses instead on improving existing, fractured data sets 39 'Some respondents argued that the reforms resulted in a large-scale agroindustry focused on short term profits at the cost of soil and the environment. It also resulted in high levels of debt among farmers, with social ills as a result. The focus on growth has led to a degradation of the soil through pesticide and fertilizer use, and absurdities such as upstream hydro dams energizing airconditioned malls in Bangkok (Marks, 2016) Beautiful (Schumacher, 2010 (Schumacher, [1973 ). Schumacher distills his lessons learned from German post-war development, put as a counterweight to seeing limitless economic growth. Schumacher's book was inspired by Burmese Buddhism (Schumacher, 2010 (Schumacher, [1973 within its sphere of influence-its network of organizations. HAII's policies do fit with the idea that an aim of action is to remove disquiet within networks of associations ('inter-being'). By requesting data sets scattered within the fractured governance system, harmonizing them, and feeding everything back into the system to further stimulate network reciprocity, increasingly functioning as a hub. The removal of disquiet and the view of reality as constituted as a set of networked relations with no real nodes is a core Buddhist idea with its own rigorous logical implications (Priest, 2016 ). HAII's emphasis on integrating and improving data instead of acquiring novel data is analogous to subjective introspection and making use of present capacity, and improving reciprocal ties between organizations by removing disturbances. Its data reflects the present state of the Chao Phraya basin and delta, anticipating locally tied possibilities, bootstrapping up instead of macroplanning. 45 HAII travels well in the region, expanding its approach to 14 different Hydro Informatics and Climate Data Centers via its collaborations with ASEAN and the World Bank. HAII's rigorous policymaking fits Buddhist worldviews.
Conclusions
Surrounded on all sides, one small delta of indomitable Thai still holds out against the concept of the delta plan. We argued that this absence was not a random outcome and can only partially be explained by (a lack of) economic and political incentives. We singled out delta plans to illustrate how incongruence between worldviews, performed in institutions, might constitute a threshold inhibiting knowledge travel. Delta plans signal fateful futures and foster desires, and bias attention away from cities and towards nation-state building. Protestant and Buddhist views differ at least on these themes: the subject-object distinction, the orientation towards the future, the normative desirability for profits, and the notion of individual salvation. As we argued, delta plans are not 'Protestant' (just as HAII is not Buddhist or an explicit part of the Buddhist inspired Sufficiency Economy). But delta plans, we argued, do fit with Progressivist-Protestant views. Delta plans infer to action from constructed possible macro futures, with data used for induction. Representations serve as information, as best guesses, to reduce choice on deltaic strategies. An ideal-typical Buddhist approach would deduce right actions from inwardly consulted intent and available means, with little to no prominence for hypothetical futures. We developed the possibility that the fit (and the incongruence with Thai worldviews) isnot coincidental. After all, professionals craft signs for technocratic ends within broader societal patterns of association. In Buddhism, imagining the future is irrelevant, even counterproductive as it causes desire and with it suffering. Settling one's intent first, attending to disquiet within one's sphere of influence, and making use of existing means are norms serving as goal-posts for inference and should result in purposeful rearranging and re-relating of present resources. If the possibility raised has merit, these Buddhist assumptions in a Buddhist society should fit better with some water governance institutions than others. We used the example of HAII to illustrate that implicit and explicit fits do exist in expertise-intensive arrangements. Far from a cultural essentialist picture, we have provided an argument on how different and contingent, associations arising over time and performed in patterned ways result in difficult travels across.
